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OWNERSHIP AND CONTENT REGULATION IN
MERGING AND EMERGING MEDIA
Daniel L. Brenner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of diversity in our communications system remains con-
stant. We want a system that relies on a multiplicity of voices and
views, an environment where listeners have an ability to listen and
speakers have an ability to speak, and, importantly, messages that
should be heard are heard. At the same time, we want to keep gov-
ernment out of the process of generating this communication as much
as possible. The First Amendment prohibits Congress from abridging
the freedom of speech and the press.' The "print model," which de-
scribes the minimal regulatory approaches taken toward newspapers,
should be the touchstone. 2 Finally, while this is a distant concern, we
remain fearful, at the edges, that individuals not obtain such power in
the media marketplace that dissenting views are shut out or that only
the views of owners are heard.3
* Vice President for Law and Regulatory Policy, National Cable Television Association,
Washington, DC; B.A., A.M., Stanford University; J.D., Stanford Law School. An earlier ver-
sion of this paper was presented at the Institute on National Affairs, Iowa State University,
Ames, Iowa, Feb. 6, 1996. The author thanks Bethel Harris, a third-year law student at Howard
Law School, for research assistance on this paper.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
2. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a Florida
statute that required newspapers to permit a right of reply to political candidates whose charac-
ter the newspaper assailed); see generally Henry Geller & Donna Lampert, Cable, Content Regu-
lation and the First Amendment, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 616-20 (1983) (describing the print
regulatory model); PATRICK PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 111-22
(1987) (applying the print model to cable television).
3. See Alexandra Marks, Mergers May Give Viewers Less Choice, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 11, 1996, at 1, 13 (reporting that the rapid consolidation of cable firms has created a few
mega-companies, which "makes it increasingly difficult, if not impossible for independent pro-
grammers to gain access to cable systems and has raised alarms over who controls what Ameri-
cans see on TV"); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379 (1969) ("[T]he
objective of adequate presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing those most closely
affected to make the response, rather than leaving the response in the hands of the station which
has attacked their candidates, endorsed their opponents, or carried a personal attack upon
them.").
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We are living through unprecedented consolidation and growth in
media. The end result should be an ever-widening array of choice.
Do we have it? How is diversity faring? And what can regulation
contribute? In the past, questions of content regulation or ownership
to promote diversity were carefully analyzed in the context of particu-
lar cases.4 Worldwide media growth suggests that we should ask if
fundamental shifts in how to think about their regulation are
warranted.
Consider the last year of media mergers and acquisitions. Disney
acquired Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. for $19 billion.5 Seagram acquired
MCA, Inc. for $5.7 billion.6 Westinghouse acquired CBS for $5.4 bil-
lion.7 Time Warner acquired Turner Broadcasting for $7.5 billion. 8
News Corp, Rupert Murdoch's enterprise, has received investment
capital from MCI of $2 billion.9 AT&T invested in GM-Hughes' DBS
system, DirecTV.10 Microsoft and MCI have formed a joint Internet
development venture.11 Microsoft has announced alliances with NBC
and Black Entertainment Television to offer content on the Internet.1 2
4. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374
(analyzing FCC regulations allowing cable operators to impose content restrictions on leased
access and public access channels); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469
(1994) (finding must-carry provisions content neutral); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 579 (1990), questioned in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)
(deferring to Congress's fact-finding and to the FCC's expertise in determining that a nexus
existed between minority ownership and the inclusion of minority views in programming); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (finding a fiduciary obligation imposed on
broadcasters by the Communications Act); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (deriving the authority to
regulate broadcasters from the uniqueness of the electromagnetic spectrum); In re Applications
of Waters Broadcasting Corp., 91 F.C.C.2d 1260, 1264 (1982)("[T]here is a critical under-
representation of minorities in broadcast ownership, and full minority participation in the own-
ership and management of broadcast facilities is essential to realize the fundamental goals of
programming diversity and diversity of ownership which are at the heart of the Communications
Act and the First Amendment.").
5. Geraldine Fabrikant, Walt Disney to Acquire ABC in $19 Billion Deal to Build a Giant for
Entertainment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995, at Al.
6. Eben Shapiro & Thomas R. King, Seagram Buys 80% of MCA at $5.7 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
April 10, 1995, at A3.
7. Raju Narisetti et al., Westinghouse in Pact to Buy CBS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2 1995, at A3.
8. Turner Broadcasting Approves Sports Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, at 37.
9. Mike Mills, MCI Poised for More Changes; Cellular Phone Firm Alliance Expected, WASH.
POST, July 28, 1995, at C1.
10. Jeff Cole, AT&T to Buy 2.5% of GM's DirecTv, Inc., WALL ST. J., Jan 23, 1996, at A2.
AT&T invested $137.5 million dollars for a 2.5% stake in DirecTV. Id. The deal also gives
AT&T an option to acquire up to 30% of DirecTV. Id.
11. Louise Kehoe, MCI and Microsoft Team Up for Online Information Venture, FIN. TIMEs,
Jan. 30, 1996, at 17.
12. Scott Hettrick, Gates Micronews: He's Soft on Video for Internet, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb.
2, 1996; New Microsoft-NBC Cable Network Plans Daily Digital Show, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17,
1996, at B9.
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Sprint formed and then backed away from a consortium venture with
Comcast, TCI and Cox Communications in the personal communica-
tions systems (PCS) marketplace. 13 NYNEX and Bell Atlantic an-
nounced a merger as did SBC Communications and Pacific Telesis
Group. 14 Viacom acquired Paramount. 15 Time Warner and Chris
Craft/Paramount have developed new television networks. 16 In addi-
tion, the new powerhouses of radio are not the old networks, but
groups like Evergreen and CBS/Infinity.' 7
The old electronic marketplace of fifteen years ago, dominated by
the three television networks and their affiliated stations, is a substan-
tial but not dominant portion of the electronic landscape. Program-
mers and distributors view the market as worldwide, not domestic.' 8
As one producer put it, a film's not been sold 'til it's been sold to
Albania. Multinational telecommunications companies are the norm,
not the exception. Step off a plane in Europe, and the first companies
that will greet you are MCI, Sprint and AT&T.
For the past two years, more personal computers than television
sets were sold in the United States.' 9 For several years, home video
revenues have exceeded theatrical revenues for movie releases. 20
Before long, the video cassette may go the way of the long playing
album, replaced by digital video CDs. Add to this the Internet. Ac-
13. John J. Keller & Mark Robichaux, Sprint's Cable-TV Alliance Alters Local-Phone and
Wireless Plans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at A3. The alliance, called the Sprint Telecommunica-
tions Venture (STV), was formed in late 1994 and originally planned to sell a package of commu-
nication services combining local, long-distance and wireless services. Id. But recently, the
partnership restructured its business plan to concentrate on building a PCS network and changed
its name to Sprint Spectrum to reflect this new focus. Id.; Sprint Spectrum Billing Contract,
WALL ST. J., July 10, 1996, at C22.
14. Lesley Cauley et al., Bell Atlantic and NYNEX Make Merger Accord Official, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 23, 1996, at A4; Steven Lipin, How Long Can Merger Boom Continue?, WALL. ST. J., July
11, 1996, at C1.
15. FCC Clears Viacom's Plan for Paramount Acquisition, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1994, at A4.
16. Elizabeth Jensen, Paramount and Chris-Craft Sign up River City in Race to Start TV Net-
work, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1993, at B9; Arthur Spiegelman, Media Giants Scramble to Form
More TV Networks, Reuter Business Report, Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
17. Steven Lipin & Elizabeth Jensen, Westinghouse, Infinity Deal Sets Stage for Other Radio
Groups Seeking Mergers, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1996, at A3; Steven Lipin & John Lippman,
Westinghouse Electric Plans to Acquire Infinity Broadcasting for up to $4 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 1996, at A3.
18. Gary Arnold, Hollywood Spends Big for Big Movies, WASH. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at D5.
Foreign box-office receipts nearly match domestic theatrical revenue. Id.
19. Business Day: Analyst Says Small Media Companies Won't Compete (CNN television
broadcast, Jan. 1, 1996); Tony Jackson, Not So Easy to Fool Wall Street, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 1995,
at 18.
20. Arnold, supra note 18, at D5.
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cording to latest estimates, one in ten adults uses the Internet, 21 and
nearly forty percent of households have personal computers-making
them all potential Internet customers. 22 Faster modems, in particular
via cable (one thousand times faster than the telephone line) will
make Internet use even more desirable. 23 Full motion video will be as
accessible on the Internet as words and data are today. How should
we regulate these merging and emerging media?
Four types of media regulation have been used in trying to foster
diversity in communications. Each expresses a different level of
awareness of the role, and limits, of regulation: (1) behavioral, (2)
structural, (3) what I call "antitrust-plus," 12 4 and (4) traditional anti-
trust regulation. The task for public policy is deciding which regula-
tion method works best to maximize content diversity yet does not
offend the First Amendment. My analysis concludes that behavioral
and structural regulation has contributed some, but not much, to con-
clusively enhancing diversity. My additional thesis is this: the market
often does a better job of improving diversity for reasons that the gov-
ernment cannot predict or mandate. This result substantially lessens
the reliability of antitrust-plus analysis. Finally, government should
pinpoint where market failures relating to speech occur and address
those shortcomings, rather than invoke an amorphous diversity goal
to justify regulation.
II. TYPES OF MEDIA REGULATION
We can start with the history of media regulation at the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission). This is a good
21. Although no one can accurately measure Internet use, most surveys estimate the number
of U.S. adults on the Internet at between 8% and 12%. G. Christian Hill & Molly Baker, In the
Dark: Companies Have Absolutely No Idea How Many Potential Customers They Have On-Line,
WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at R26; see, e.g., Joann Muller & Ronald Rosenberg, Small Business
Survey: Executives See Rise in Profits, Hiring, BOSTON GLOBE, June 30, 1996, at 74 (reporting
results from a survey conducted by Forrester Research, Inc. estimating nearly 8% of adults use
the World Wide Web); Don Sheron, Home Computer Usage Growing-Age, Income, Education
Leading Indicators for Ownership, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws, July 28, 1996 (citing separate
surveys by Decision Analyst and the Roper Poll finding 12% of adult Americans access the
Internet). Some market research firms predict that by the year 2000, 20% of adults will be on-
line. Muller & Rosenberg, supra, at 74. Yet, in view of the popularity and exponential growth
the Internet has already witnessed in such a relatively brief period, this number appears
conservative.
22. G. Christian Hill, Tally at Homes with PCs Increased 16% Last Year, WALL ST. J., May 21,
1996, at B10.
23. Harry A. Jessell, High-Speed Modems a Top Priority, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 4,
1995, at 82.
24. The term "antitrust plus" or "plus factors" refers to other evidence besides behavior tra-
ditionally considered anticompetitive.
[Vol. 45:10091012
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place to begin because the FCC and the Communications Act of
193425 best reflect the first two categories of regulation: behavioral
and structural.
A. Behavioral Regulation
Behavioral regulation-controlling what's communicated-is the
first resort of those dissatisfied with the performance of the media.
Since its creation, the FCC has been charged with regulating radio,
and then television, in the "public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity."' 26 To provide meaning to these words, the Commission has from
time-to-time reached out to regulate broadcasting content. Formal ef-
forts to define the public "interest" include the 1946 Blue Book27 and
the 1960 Program Policy Statement,28 which obligated a broadcaster
to develop a diversity-rich programming environment-if the broad-
caster expected to have its license easily renewed. 29
The Commission issued and rescinded percentage guidelines for
news and public affairs programming. 30 It adopted, 31 enforced, 32 and
then repealed 33 the Fairness Doctrine, which required coverage of
25. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-614 (1994)).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
27. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROAD-
CAST LICENSEES (1946), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 148-63 (Frank
J. Kahn ed., 4th ed. 1984) (outlining the Commission's programming policy recognizing the need
for broadcasters to air programs of community interest).
28. Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, 44
F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
29. Id. at 2314-15 (identifying "the major elements usually necessary to meet the public inter-
est, needs and desires of the community ... as developed by the industry, and recognized by the
Commission").
30. Compare In re Revision of FCC Form 303, Application for Renewal of Broadcast Station
License, and Certain Rules Relating Thereto, 59 F.C.C.2d 750, 767-72 (1976) (announcing guide-
lines for licensees to follow to ensure appropriate scheduling of public interest programming)
with In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Re-
quirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d
1076 (1984) (concluding that marketplace forces rather than existing guidelines will ensure that
non-entertainment programming responds to community needs).
31. In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter Editorializ-
ing by Broadcast Licensees].
32. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 375-86 (1969) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine and the Commission's right-of-reply rules issued in
1967). To establish a fairness violation, a complainant must show that the broadcaster presented
only one viewpoint on a "controversial issue of public importance" and "failed to afford a rea-
sonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints." In re The Handling of Pub-
lic Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications
Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1974).
33. In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 147 (1985).
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controversial issues and afforded reasonable opportunities for con-
trasting viewpoints on those issues.34 It engaged in enforcement
against offensive programming, from the 1930s, when it condemned
words like "damn" as profane, 35 to last year's case against shock jock
Howard Stern.36 The behavioral model continues to operate, exempli-
fied by efforts to regulate speech on the Internet 37 or requirements
that TV broadcasters not classify programs like The Jetsons as
educational. 38
Regulating editorial behavior as a means of enforcing the goal of
speech diversity almost always runs counter to the "print model."
Print was the technology extant at the time of the founding fathers.
As Judge David Bazelon wrote seventeen years ago, the print model's
"'hands off policy,' has proven more durable and more congenial to
our national political values than the 'different' First Amendment
standards" of a behavioral model.39 As he concluded, "government
intervention is as likely to suppress diversity as to promote it."'4°
It's hard to quarrel with what motivates many behavioral restric-
tions. The argument against the Fairness Doctrine was never that it
was a bad idea.41 As a private policy, it's a good idea; coverage of
controversial issues is what journalism is all about, and offering con-
34. The Fairness Doctrine required that "licensees devote a reasonable percentage of their
broadcasting time to the discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by their
stations and that such programs be designed so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to
hear different opposing positions on the public issues of interest and importance in the commu-
nity." Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, supra note 31, at 1257-58.
35. Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931).
36. See In re Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 10 F.C.C.R. 12245 (1995) (entering into a
$1,715,000 settlement agreement with Infinity Broadcasting Corp. arising from enforcement pro-
ceedings involving the Howard Stern Show).
37. The most well-known example is the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), which
was enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, 110 Stat. 133, 133-43 (1996). Recently, two provisions of the CDA
directed at communications over the Internet that might be deemed "indecent" or "patently
offensive" for those under 18 were held unconstitutional by two three-judge federal district
courts. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
Pa. 1996).
38. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, 10 F.C.C.R.
6308 (1995). According to a study of broadcast license renewal applications filed in 1992, many
stations asserted that programs such as G.L Joe, Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, and The Jetsons
were specifically designed to meet children's educational needs. Id. at 6317 n.32. The Commis-
sion was not persuaded, however, concluding that such programs were "of dubious educational
value to children." Id. at 6317.
39. David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New Directions in Regu-
lating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 212 (1979).
40. Id.
41. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1019 (1990) (discussing arguments for and against the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine).
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trasting viewpoints is what unbiased reporting aims to do. In addition,
preventing people from hearing speech that shocks or deeply offends,
particularly over a medium where the speaker did not pay for its spec-
trum but obtained it by promising to serve the public interest, is
hardly an offensive idea.
The goals of behavioral regulation aren't the problem; its enforce-
ment is. Behavioral regulation necessarily involves the government in
evaluating the content of programming. The government must pre-
scribe how to balance controversial issues, such as what indecency is,
or why certain programming-children's education, news, or public
affairs-must be carried, when other outlets may already carry similar
programming or, alternatively, are not regulated at all. 42
B. Structural Regulation
Structural regulation offers ostensible relief from these shortcom-
ings. Structural regulation addresses the pattern of ownership; diver-
sity is defined not by what is said, but by who says it.43 Over the years,
Congress and the FCC have limited who may own outlets and how
many they may own. For example, while there is no ban on foreign
ownership of newspapers or cable systems, a foreign entity may not
control a radio or television outlet.44 Limits have been set on the
number of stations or percentage of homes one company may control
nationally,45 as well as the total number of homes that one entity may
serve by cable. 46 In individual markets, certain cross-ownership rela-
42. As Judge Bazelon has remarked, "[tihe result is nothing short of placing a government
editor in the programming booth." Bazelon, supra note 39, at 206.
43. For further discussion of structural regulation, see DANIEL L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE
TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 6.01[1] (1996).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1994).
45. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(el)-(e3) (1995). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the
FCC to eliminate the restrictions on national radio and television station ownership that were
imposed by 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555. 47 U.S.C.A. § 202(a), (c)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
46. A portion of Section 11(c) of the 1992 Cable Act directed the FCC to "prescribe rules and
regulations establishing reasonable limits on the number of cable subscribers" a cable operator is
authorized to reach through cable systems it owns or in which it has an attributable interest.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec.
11(c), § 613(f)(1)(A), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486-87 (1992). The 1992 Cable Act's horizontal ownership
limits were struck down as unconstitutional in Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.
Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1993). In finding the horizontal limits incompatible with the First Amend-
ment, the Daniels court stated that "[a]ny governmentally ordained quota on the number of
subscribers a cable operator may reach leaves the grantor with absolutely no intra-medium
means of speaking to the remainder of its potential audience." Id. An appeal of the Daniels
court's decision striking down the horizontal ownership limitation provision is currently before
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Time Warner Entertain-
ment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (consolidating Time Warner's
challenge to the constitutionality of the Cable Act's horizontal ownership limitation provision
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tionships have been prohibited from time-to-time, including newspa-
per-broadcast and television-cable. 47 Finally, there are intramarket
limits on the number of radio or TV stations one may own.48
Structural regulation takes nonownership forms too. For instance,
cable television was structurally limited early on in its development
when the FCC restricted the number of distant TV signals that could
be imported from other markets.49 Broadcast network development
was hampered by the decision to intermix VHF and UHF band sta-
tions in the same market instead of making all markets UHF.50 This
decision eliminated the possibility of more than three same-band na-
tional networks. 51 It was only with cable television, which placed
VHF and UHF stations on an equal footing as far as reception was
concerned, did intermixed networks like Fox, WB and UPN become
financially viable.52
Structural regulations can also directly undermine diversity. Take
the "must-carry" statute, which requires cable systems to carry all lo-
cal TV stations requesting carriage.5 3 Such provisions were not based
on the particular content of local television stations, but were adopted
to insure that local broadcasting would survive.54 In practice, how-
ever, these rules stymie diversity. Local stations that have virtually no
over-the-air viewership, let alone a cable audience, are permitted to
invoke must-carry rights against cable operators and force their way
with its challenge to regulations promulgated by the FCC implementing this statutory provision
in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, No. 94-1035 (D.C. Cir.).
47. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1994) (prohibiting simultaneous cable and television station own-
ership). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 repealed the broadcast-cable cross-ownership
ban. 47 U.S.C.A. § 202(0(1).
48. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (a)-(d) (1995). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 resets these caps
to a higher limit. 47 U.S.C.A. § 202(b), (c)(1)(B), (d).
49. See In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Commission's Rule and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 170-85 (1972) (describing
signal carriage rules), on recons. 36 F.C.C.2d. 326 (1972). The signal carriage rules limited the
number of television station signals outside of a cable system's area that the system was permit-
ted to transmit to its subscribers. See id. at app. A (amending 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59, 76.61, 76.63,
and 76.151-76.161). This number varied depending on the size of the television market in which
the cable system was located and the number of over-the-air signals in that market. Id. For an
excellent account of the FCC's initial efforts to regulate cable television, see DON LE Duc,
CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973).
50. Bazelon, supra note 39, at 205. For a description and analysis of the Commission's policies
toward television see ROGER NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION,
97-128 (1973).
51. Bazelon, supra note 39, at 205.
52. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Station Brakes: The Government's Campaign Against Cable Tele-
vision, REASON, Feb. 1995, at 40, 46 ("The arrival of Fox was directly linked to the enhancement
of VHF stations over cable ... ").
53. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (1994).
54. Thrner Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2454-55 (1994).
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onto systems.55 Meanwhile, new program services delivered by satel-
lite that could occupy those channel positions are excluded.
Similarly, restrictions on station ownership in markets may para-
doxically contribute to less diversity, not more. As Peter Steiner56 and
others have shown, if there is a single owner of multiple radio stations
within a market, that owner may be more likely to program minority
taste formats than if the radio stations are separately owned.5 7 For
example, suppose eighty percent of a market prefers contemporary
hits, ten percent prefers classical, and ten percent prefers all talk and
you have four stations in the market with four separate owners. All of
the owners will be competing for the contemporary format. None of
the four would likely serve the classical or talk formats because in a
four-way split each gets twenty percent of that larger contemporary
hit market. Theoretically, at least, a single owner of all four stations
would maximize audience by carrying three different formats, since
one hundred percent of the audience would be reached.
Scale economies, not format diversity, led the FCC on its own in the
1980s to permit greater control by single owners in the market.58 This
was accomplished first by increasing the number of stations one entity
could control in a market and then by encouraging agreements by
55. See id. at 2453-54 (discussing the must-carry provisions).
56. See Peter 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competi-
tion in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194, 212-17 (1952) (demonstrating that monopoly
ownership produces greater diversity in the radio programming context).
57. Id.; see also Daniel L. Brenner, Government Regulation of Radio Program Format
Changes, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 56, 63-69 (1978) (questioning assumptions underpinning Steiner's
economic model and concluding that it cannot be determined whether a radio industry structure
based on a pure competition model or one based on a monopoly model provides greater pro-
gram diversity or maximizes listener utility).
58. See, e.g., In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.6361
of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad-
cast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 22 (1984) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership Rules] (describing po-
tential efficiency gains from repealing the national ownership caps for radio and television); In re
Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules, the Broadcast Multiple Ownership
Rules, 4 F.C.C.R. 1723 (1989) (relaxing the radio duopoly rule).
Common ownership of radio stations often leads to greater efficiencies. In relaxing the local
radio ownership rules, the FCC enumerated economies of scale hampered by then-existing re-
strictions as follows:
By artificially denying stations efficiencies that could be realized through consolidation
of facilities, managerial and clerical staffs, sales, bookkeeping, promotion, production,
news and other aspects of station operation, the local ownership restrictions increase
the costs of doing business at a time when cost-savings may well be critical to survive.
In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2774 (1992) [hereinafter Revision of
Radio Rules and Policies]. For a cogent analysis of revisions to the radio ownership rules see
David M. Hunsaker, Duopoly Wars: Analysis and Case Studies of the FCC's Radio Contour
Overlap Rules, 2 COMMLAW CONSPEcrus 21 (1994).
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which one station managed two stations within the same market.5 9
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 frees local radio ownership even
more.60 Of course, not every form of structural regulation is bad pub-
lic policy. Yet, time has shown, that what seem like inviolate struc-
tural rules become less so in hindsight. For instance, in radio, as the
national ownership cap rose from seven to twelve to no limit,61 as-
sumptions that the initial rules were intrinsically wise and provided
some durable bulwark for diversity crumbled. What we can say is that
ownership caps provide a predictable means of testing concentration
in the marketplace, offering certainty for government and business.
But, these caps probably fall well below what the antitrust laws might
permit.
C. "Antitrust-Plus" Regulation
This brings us to the third form of diversity regulation, what I call
"antitrust-plus." The "plus" comes from inclusion of factors beyond
pure economic analysis to analyze mergers and acquisitions. Anti-
trust-plus analysis can be observed in some antitrust cases.62 But since
the 1970s, there's been a marked shift away from analysis that in-
cludes political considerations. 63 The Federal Trade Commission
Chairman Robert Pitofsky has articulated the difference this way:
59. See Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, supra note 58, at 2761 (relaxing the local owner-
ship rules and allowing consolidation through joint venture arrangements).
60. 47 U.S.C.A. § 202(b). The Commission has, in essence, been instructed not only to modify
its rules to eliminate limitations on the number of radio stations an entity may own or control on
a national level, but also to modify its rules regarding local radio station ownership. Id. There-
fore, the Commission's modification of its rules regarding ownership, operation, or control in a
local market in fact frees local ownership.
61. In 1953, the FCC formally adopted a Seven Station Rule, which prohibited individuals or
entities from owning more than seven AM stations and seven FM radio stations. Multiple Own-
ership Rules, supra note 58, at 22. In 1984, the FCC relaxed the Seven Station Rule, permitting
ownership of up to 12 AM stations and 12 FM stations nationwide. Id. at 18. In 1992, the FCC
further relaxed the national ownership caps, permitting ownership of up to 30 AM stations and
30 FM stations. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, supra note 58, at 2761. The new telecom-
munications legislation directs the FCC to eliminate the national ownership caps entirely. 47
U.S.C.A. § 202(a).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43 (1960) ("[A]n unlawful
combination is not just as arises from a price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a
combination is also organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by means
which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his announced
policy."); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 719 (1948) (ruling that one of the key "plus factors"
is the sudden adoption of a new system the effect of which is to help stabilize prices in an indus-
try when demand is declining); In re General Foods Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21,173 (July 14, 1976) (considering the heterogeneity of the good merely as a
"plus factor" justifying intensified scrutiny in some nonquantifiable weighing scheme).
63. See William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transforma-
tion of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990) (discussing the shift toward an
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"It has become common for antitrust economists, academics and
lawyers to argue that the antitrust laws should be interpreted exclu-
sively to serve economic goals-I believe that is wrong. Concern
about concentrated economic power should be given added weight
where the merger (or a wave of mergers) concerns companies in-
volved in the communication of ideas.
In those industries, there is more at stake than high prices or low
quality to consumers-there is a more fundamental issue of avoid-
ing centralized control over access to the marketplace of ideas." 64
Under this view, diversity can be hampered by concentration of me-
dia. This assumption may call into question a merger or acquisition,
even if that proposed activity cannot objectively be found to substan-
tially lessen competition in the relevant advertising or programming
markets.65 This idea is not new, but it is out of favor among many
who would rely more on economic efficiency to the exclusion of diver-
sity or political considerations in making an antitrust evaluation, par-
ticularly considering scale efficiencies that larger enterprises, media
and nonmedia, typically generate. 66
D. Traditional Antitrust Regulation
Finally, there is standard antitrust analysis, which treats communi-
cations no differently than other economic sectors. Under this analy-
sis, government would apply traditional measures of scale efficiencies
and concentration to decide whether or not mergers and acquisitions
efficiency-oriented antitrust policy). Professor Kovacic credits Robert Bork's 1978 book The
Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself with playing a "singular influential role in trans-
forming antitrust doctrine and policy." Id. at 1444-45. He writes that "[s]ince 1890, no single
scholarly work has exacted greater influence than the Antitrust Paradox on the direction of anti-
trust policy." Id. at 1417.
64. Kirk Victor, Merger Man, NAT'L J., Jan. 20, 1996, at 121 (quoting Pitofsky's testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights).
65. See Marianne Lavelle, Telecom Merger Tests New Law Limits, NAT'L L.J, Apr. 15, 1996, at
A16 (reporting that consumer groups hope the SBC-Pacific Telesis merger will provide antitrust
regulators like Pitofsky with the opportunity to test the theory that media mergers merit greater
scrutiny than mergers in other industries).
66. See Kovacic, supra note 63, at 1459-71 (noting the influence economic efficiency analysis
has had on scholars, politicians and the courts). Since the late 1970s, the decisions of many
federal judges have reflected the influence of Chicago School efficiency principles. See, e.g.,
United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.); United States v.
Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1033 (1987);
Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,
J.); United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J.); cf. United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (forbidding a merger between two grocery
chains accounting for 7.5% of the metropolitan Los Angeles retail grocery market); see generally
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 427 (1993) (ar-
guing that the exclusive goal of antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare).
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produce an undue tendency toward monopolization or substantially
lessen competition. 67 This is an economic view of antitrust analysis.68
If competitive analysis leads to disapproval that's one thing, diversity
should not be an independent factor.
Even under the standard antitrust analysis, there are obvious grada-
tions of scrutiny. The general view of antitrust enforcement during
the Reagan years was to relax the merger and acquisition standards
for all industries, including media. 69 Some observers see stepped-up
enforcement under the Clinton Administration.70 The point here,
however, is that no special political considerations should apply where
the merger involves media as opposed to nonmedia activity. Thus, a
stricter antitrust enforcement standard might produce a less concen-
trated industry with whatever effect on diversity, but enforcement is
not driven by diversity as a factor.
These, then, are the means the government employs to regulate di-
versity: behavioral rules, content-neutral structural rules, antitrust-
plus analysis that expressly considers the diversity-enhancing aspects
of a proposed merger or acquisition, and antitrust analysis that does
not vary because the communications industry is involved.
III. MINORITIES AND THE MEDIA UNDER BEHAVIORAL AND
STRUCTURAL REGULATION
The government hasn't tried every conceivable form of behavioral
or structural regulation. But, any such efforts to enhance diversity
must be weighed against the enormous market forces that govern the
commercial electronic system of speech. This is not to say that noth-
ing can or should ever be tried to improve diversity in telecommunica-
67. The competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions of stock or assets are principally gov-
erned by § 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions "in any line of com-
merce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, [where] the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
68. For a general treatment of economic analysis in antitrust law see BORK, supra note 66;
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTrr~UsT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVE (1976).
69. See Kovacic, supra note 63, at 1445-46 (describing the redirection of federal antitrust en-
forcement policy during the Reagan Administration and citing sources); Thomas J. Campbell,
The Antitrust Record of the First Reagan Administration, 64 TEx. L. REV., 353, 366-69 (1985)
(discussing the muted rigor of the Justice Department's merger guidelines during the Reagan
Administration); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the
Reagan Administration, 33 AN=rrRusT BULL. 211 (1988) (evaluating the Reagan Administra-
tion's antitrust policies toward mergers and finding a significant decrease in enforcement activity
against them).
70. See, e.g., Stephen J. Squeri, Government Investigation and Enforcement: Antitrust Division,
942 PLI/CoR 539, 602 (1995) (noting the heightened antitrust enforcement activism of the Clin-
ton Administration).
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tions. It's simply to say that such activity must be carefully targeted
and is, generally speaking, unlikely to overpower those market forces.
Let's examine behavioral and structural regulation by way of exam-
ple. Perhaps there is no more important issue of diversity than the
greater inclusion of minority and gender voices in mass communica-
tions. Called to account on the race riots of the mid-1960s by the Ker-
ner Commission's 1968 report,71 the FCC, Congress, and the media
recognized the poor job of including authentic voices from minority
communities in news and entertainment programming. 72 The 1950s
and 1960s experienced routine exclusion of minorities on local and
national television programs.73 Behind the scenes, generally all-white,
all-male newsrooms dominated.74 Even today, Asians, Latinos, gays,
and the physically disabled remain all but invisible in mainstream en-
tertainment programming.75
How has government policy operated in this context? From the be-
havioral side, one detects little specific content regulation aimed at
increasing the diversity of speech addressing minority tastes and
needs. The FCC requires stations to serve all community elements,
but license renewal challenges of radio and television stations that
71. REPORT OF THE U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
[hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION REPORT].
72. See id. at 382-89 (identifying systemic racial exclusion in news and entertainment program-
ming and proposing the establishment of a private, nonprofit entity to carry out the media rec-
ommendations of the Commission to address these problems).
73. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 71, at 385-86 (noting that blacks are largely
neglected on television and recommending they be included in all forms of television
programming).
74. In examining the media, the Kerner Commission found:
The journalistic profession has been shockingly backward in seeking out, hiring,
training, and promoting Negroes. Fewer than 5 percent of the people employed by the
news business in editorial jobs in the United States today are Negroes. Fewer than 1
percent of editors and supervisors are Negroes, and most of them work for Negro-
owned organizations.
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 71, at 384.
Even today, more than two decades after the Kerner Commission issued warnings to the me-
dia to improve minority representation, the number of minorities in newsrooms falls well below
their percentage in the total population. George Garneau, Tempers Flare; Minority Journalists
Tell National Newspaper Association Officials That More Has to Be Done in Diversifying New-
srooms, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Dec. 12, 1992, at 14.
75. E.g., Greg Braxton & Jan Breslauer, Casting the Spotlight on TV's Brownout; Critics Say
the Networks Are Ignoring America's Fast-Growing Minority, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995 (Calen-
dar), at 8; Marilyn Gardner, A Call for More Minorities (and Fewer Stereotypes) on TV, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 13, 1995, at 12; Manuel Mendoza, Sitcom Segregation, DALLAS
MORNING TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at Cl; Mark A. Perigard, How Well Does Prime-Time TV Match
the Makeup of Society? An Exclusive TV Plus Survey Raises Troubling Issues, BOSTON HERALD,
Nov. 5, 1995.
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cited a failure to meet those needs were generally unsuccessful. 76 In-
deed, the leading example of a station losing is license for failure to
meet minority needs was the celebrated 1968 United Church of Christ
case involving WLBT-TV in Jackson, Mississippi. 77 There, the United
States Court of Appeals ordered the FCC to take WLBT's license
away, essentially disgusted with the agency's pro-incumbent posture.78
In another instance, one in which the Commission was confronted
with abject racist speech in a political advertisement, the J.B. Stoner
case,79 the Commission interpreted the equal time laws under section
315 of the Communications Act of 1934 as prohibiting it from censor-
ing the candidate's racist message.80
The FCC's method for determining whether a station meets com-
munity needs today-the requirement that an issues list be created
identifying programming that illustrates how the station addresses
community problems-has become mostly a paperwork burden.81 It
is hard to distinguish between a station that addresses the needs of
urban housing by means of primetime specials involving local commu-
nity groups or mere public service announcements giving the name
and number of housing discrimination agencies. Nor did the Commis-
sion ever say, with good First Amendment reason, what the minimum
requirements were in this regard.
76. See, e.g., In re License Renewal Applications of Certain Broadcast Stations Licensed for
and Serving the State of Mississippi, 59 F.C.C.2d 1335, 1335-36 (1976) (dismissing petition in-
cluding, among other charges, allegations charging 73 broadcast stations with discriminating
against African-Americans in employment).
77. In re Application of Lamar Life Ins. Co. for Renewal of License of Television Station
WLBT and Auxiliary Service, Jackson, Miss., 14 F.C.C.2d 495 (1967).
78. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 550 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). United Church marked the first time a United States court ordered a regulatory
license to be terminated. FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GUYS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 100-01 (1976). For a detailed account of the WLBT saga see id. at 89-102.
79. In re Complaint by Atlanta NAACP, Atlanta Ga. Concerning Section 315 Political Broad-
cast by J.B. Stoner, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).
80. Id. at 637. In refusing to prohibit the licensee from broadcasting the political advertise-
ment, the Commission believed that it was constrained by § 315, which states in relevant part
that a "licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provi-
sions of this section" and § 326 of the Act, which prohibits the Commission from censoring
broadcasts or interfering with the right of free speech by means of radio communication. Id. at
636-37. In addition, the Commission interpreted First Amendment case law as proscribing inter-
ference with the political candidate's right of free speech in this case. Id. at 637.
81. See In re Deregulation of Radio, 104 F.C.C.2d 505, 506 (1986) (requiring that a radio
licensee maintain a list of issue responsive programming to determine whether the station has
fulfilled its programming obligations); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 779 F.2d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (vacating the Commission's order issuing a new
regulation requiring broadcast licensees to maintain a list of at least five to ten community issues
aired by the station during each three-month period as arbitrary and capricious).
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These difficulties with a content-oriented approach led the Commis-
sion to implement structural initiatives. Equal employment opportu-
nity (EEO) guidelines were established for broadcasting and cable to
increase the number of minorities and women employed in these in-
dustries.82 The EEO guidelines have no doubt been salutary in terms
of boosting the opportunities for previously excluded groups. But, it
is difficult to say that these employment activities have actually led to
greater programming diversity. Most television programming is pro-
duced by syndicators or networks, which obtain no government li-
cense and whose employment practices are not regulated by the
FCC.83 For minorities and women conceivably to affect diversity,
their ranks should be measured at the content-production level. In-
stead, the Commission's rules regulate employment opportunities at
outlets like cable systems and local radio and television stations,
where few programming decisions likely to affect ethnic diversity are
made.84
In the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC made other important efforts to
increase diversity through structural regulation. For example, to stim-
ulate minority ownership in broadcasting, the Commission instituted
its distress sale and tax certificate policies for broadcast properties.85
The distress sale policy, which has fallen into some disuse because few
stations actually get designated for hearing,86 permits a broadcaster
facing renewal or revocation of its license to transfer or assign its li-
82. 47 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
83. Evan Gahr, FCC Preferences: Affirmative Action for the Wealthy, INSIGTrr, Feb. 22, 1993,
at 6, 9.
84. The current broadcast EEO rules are set forth in 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.2080 (1995) (radio and
television). Cable operators are required to employ equal employment opportunity require-
ments via 47 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994). The current cable television EEO rules are set forth in 47
C.F.R. §§ 76.71-76.79 (1995).
85. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979,
982-83 (1978). In 1982, the FCC extended the tax certificate policy to cable television. Policy
Statement on Minority Ownership of Cable Television Facilities, 52 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1469
(1982).
86. See Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of Minority Advocacy Before the FCC: Using Market-
place Rhetoric to Urge Policy Change, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 133, 146 (1989). Even when em-
ployed, the distress sale program represented only a tiny fraction of all broadcast sales. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 599 (1990), questioned in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). Between 1979 and 1990 less than .04% of all broadcast sales were
distress sales. Id. In absolute terms, only 38 distress sales were approved by the FCC during the
period 1978-1990. Id.; Mary Tabor, Encouraging "Those Who Would Speak out with a Fresh
Voice" Through the Federal Communication Commission's Minority Ownership Policies, 76
IOWA L. REv. 609, 620 (1991).
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cense to a qualified minority at a distress price. 87 The licensee can
receive up to seventy-five percent of the station's fair market value
(which it could conceivably entirely lose through an adverse finding at
the hearing) and a minority broadcaster emerges.88
While there have been some successes, distress sale stations were
often struggling operationally and made poor opportunities for new
licensees. 89 Moreover, there was no assurance that the markets
served by these stations would be interested in the program diversity
that a minority or female broadcaster could offer. This is not to say
that minority broadcasters could not and did not succeed in these ven-
tures, or even that the policy presupposes a nexus between the race or
gender of a broadcaster and the programming he or she provides.
But, in all likelihood the market more influences what is broadcast
than ethnicity or gender-in short, as a tool for program diversity,
distress sales were limited in their effectiveness.90
Similarly, under the Commission's tax certificate program, a com-
pany selling a broadcast or cable television outlet could receive a
deferral of capital gains taxes on the sale if it transferred the property
to a qualified minority or female.91 This policy has been considerably
more effective than the distress sale policy in linking minority and fe-
87. In re Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales and Tax
Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, 1 F.C.C.R. 1315, 1316
(1986).
88. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 557-58 (stating that under the Commission's distress
sale program the minority buyer must purchase the license before the revocation or renewal
hearing begins and the price paid must not exceed 75% of fair market value).
89. For many minority buyers, access to capital is a formidable barrier to media ownership
because it circumscribes the type of broadcast properties available to them. "[B]ecause capital is
in short supply to many minorities, their market may be restricted to AM's, weak or already-in-
trouble FM's and small-market, usually independent TV stations, the properties the FCC and
National Association of Broadcasters have consistently said are in the most trouble." Patrick J.
Sheridan, Study to Show Drop in Minority Ownership, BROADCASTING, Sept. 23, 1991, at 50.
Limited to faltering broadcast properties, it comes as little surprise that a high number of minor-
ity-owned stations have found themselves in financial trouble. Id.; see also Patrick J. Sheridan,
Minority Ownership of Radio, TV Drops in 1991, BROADCASTING, Dec. 16, 1991, at 47 (citing an
NTIA study finding that first-time minority buyers must often settle for already troubled, small-
to-medium-size market AM stations).
90. Gahr, supra note 83, at 9.
91. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, supra note 85, at
983 n.19; see In re Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing, Distress Sales
and Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, supra note 87,
at 1316 (stating that "[t]ax certificates allow the seller to defer capital gains taxation on the
proceeds of the sale"); Edmund L. Andrews & Geraldine Fabrikant, The Black Entrepreneur at a
Firestorm's Center, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at D1 (reporting that the FCC's tax certificate
program permits a company selling a broadcasting or cable television property to defer capital
gains taxes if it sells to a minority-owned company).
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male entrepreneurs with properties they would like to operate. 92 But,
even this policy found its limits.
In 1995, Viacom proposed spinning its cable systems off to a quali-
fied minority owner.93 Under the terms of the deal, most of the fi-
nancing would have come from an investment firm whose major
stockholders included TCI, two large pension funds, and the Bank of
America.94 Further, the investment firm had an option to buy out the
minority owner's stake after only three years.95 Critics of the deal on
the House Ways and Means Committee objected, contending that the
proposed transaction illustrated precisely why the tax certificate pro-
gram did little to promote true minority ownership of media compa-
nies.96 Shortly thereafter, Congress concluded that the benefits of
ownership diversity measured against the tax revenue lost to deferral
no longer justified the policy. 97 As a result, Congress repealed the tax
certificate program.98
There have been other structural efforts, notably the availability of
higher ownership caps where a broadcaster has a substantial minority
partner and governmental funding efforts such as minority enterprise
small business loans and private financing efforts, such as the broad-
92. See Geoffrey Foisie, Minority Tax Certificates: Heating to Slow Boil, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Sept. 6, 1993, at 59 (noting that the FCC has authorized approximately 300 certificates
since the tax certificate program's inception in 1978); Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of Minority
Advocacy Before the FCC: Using Marketplace Rhetoric to Urge Policy Change, 41 FED. COMM.
L.J. 133, 145 (1989) ("The tax certificate is a valuable means of producing diversity in the broad-
cast market because it has demonstrably increased minority ownership of broadcast stations.").
93. Andrews & Fabrikant, supra note 91, at D1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Senate Committee on Finance, in its review of the administration and operation
of the program found it to have been subject to "significant abuse." S. REP. No. 16, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 89, 98. For instance, the Committee wrote:
[T]he FCC's definition of "control" for purposes of its minority ownership policies pro-
vides little guarantee that a minority will effectively manage a broadcast property after
the sale of property has been certified. In addition, because the FCC generally requires
only one year of minority ownership or control to qualify for a tax certificate, [the
program] has frequently resulted in only transitory minority ownership of broadcast
properties, i.e., in many cases the granting of the tax certificate has not resulted in
achieving the objective of minority ownership or control.
S. REP. No. 16, supra, at 17, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 98.
97. Id.; see also Foisie, supra note 92, at 59 (evaluating proposals to revamp the tax certificate
program).
98. I.R.C. § 1071 (1994), repealed by Act of Apr. 11, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-7, § 2, 109 Stat. 93.
In my opinion, it was unfair to make this change after the parties had relied on it. But, here, too,
it was difficult to demonstrate an increase in diversity of programming that was associated with
the policy.
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cast industry's BROADCAP fund.99 These efforts may lead to bene-
fits other than a direct change in programming diversity. For instance,
there has been an undeniable increase in the number of minority and
women leaders in the executive counsels of cable and broadcasting. 100
These persons can and do influence company policies and, perhaps,
the programming from content suppliers.' 0 In addition, by breaking
through race and gender barriers, these entrepreneurs provide role
models for the next generation of leaders. Add to this voluntary pro-
grams like cable television's Kaitz Foundation, which recruits mid-
level minority executives. 02 Doubtless, a person's background, out-
look and experience will influence a range of business decisions, in-
cluding those relating to program diversity. It is on this premise that
such structural regulations must stake much of their justification.
IV. OWNERSHIP, SIZE, AND DIVERSITY
The behavioral and structural regulation just discussed, tell us little
about how antitrust review of a particular merger should proceed.
What such regulation does suggest, however, is that generalized as-
sumptions about diversity effects as a basis for disallowing a merger
should be examined carefully. Generalized appeals to speech diver-
sity in affirmative behavioral and structural regulation have produced
indirect, and at times imperceptible, results. Moreover, size can often
be associated with pro-diversity elements that cannot be predicted
before a merger takes place, and might not occur if a merger is stifled.
99. The BROADCAP fund was established by the Broadcast Capital Fund, Inc., a venture
capital company that has financed many minority broadcasters. FCC Minority Tax Certificates:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1995) (testimony of John E. Oxendine, President and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Broadcast Capital Fund, Inc. & President and Chief Executive Officer, Blackstar Commu-
nications, Inc.). As a private initiative formed with the broadcast industry, the BROADCAP
fund has helped to promote broadcast ownership by minorities previously barred by a lack of
access to capital. Id. at 149.
100. See Claudia Puig & Greg Braxton, Minorities Open Doors for Each Other in Hollywood,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7,1995, at Al, A22-A23 (noting the gains women and minorities have made in
the top ranks of the film and broadcast industries).
101. See Carolyn M. Brown & Nadirah Z. Sabir, The Promise of Programming, BLACK EN-
TERPRISE, Feb. 1996, at 170 (discussing the increase in black-oriented and black-owned program-
ming on cable television); Carolyn M. Brown, Fighting For Air Time, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Dec.
1994, at 92, 94 (noting the increase in the number of blacks who are writing, directing and pro-
ducing primetime programming).
102. In an effort to help promote minority representation within the broadcasting industry,
the Walter Kaitz Foundation was established in 1981 as a training and job referral service. Jane
Greenstein, Minorities Still Scant in Cable, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, July 16, 1990, at S4, S16. The
foundation's board is filled with top executives from major cable networks and multiple system
operators who "have committed themselves to hiring Kaitz referrals." Id.
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These benefits counteract the assumptions behind the antitrust-plus
reservations about merger activity.
Larger companies possess abilities that can produce greater diver-
sity for society. First, they can finance start-up content activity that
smaller entities cannot afford. That modus operandi drives the basic
economics of the motion picture and sound recording industries; for
every ten attempts, a couple will be hits that will finance the eight
misses. The larger the company, the more likely that it will be able to
commit resources to establishing distinct voices. Consider this exam-
ple: In Washington, D.C., several smaller, separately owned radio sta-
tions have combined to rely on the same company to provide all local
news reports, a service that's an offshoot of traffic reporting.10 3 Such
combination is legal under the FCC rules.10 4 But it is an unfortunate
development because this type of partnering means less independent
local reporting and a tendency to greater homogeneity, or one-size-
fits-all news. In this case, separate ownership does not contribute any-
thing in terms of news diversity.
Second, large companies are often better positioned to combat gov-
ernment censorship and support First Amendment freedoms. The
Pentagon Papers case defended by The New York Times,10 5 and the
Watergate investigations conducted by The Washington Post, required
deep pockets. 10 6 Whatever you think of Howard Stern, he is a differ-
ent voice. A smaller radio company could not have afforded to wage
a legal campaign on his behalf or pay the fines he drew without going
bankrupt. 0 7 Small media voices do fight back against government re-
straints, but many cannot afford to.
Third, large media players see diversity as a way to grow their oper-
ations and have been responsible for advances in expanding speech
diversity. Let me return again to diversity of voices for minorities and
women. Perhaps the most powerful national minority distribution
outlet in the United States is Black Entertainment Television
103. Randall Bloomquist, Do Not Attempt to Change That Dial, WASH. CIrY PAPER, Jan. 12,
1996, at 10.
104. Id. at 12.
105. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
106. During the Watergate investigation, the Washington Post had encountered fierce attacks
from the White House and Nixon supporters. Eamonn P. O'Neill, Sex, Lies and Audio Tape,
HERALD (Glasgow), June 20, 1992, at 2.
107. See In re Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 10 F.C.C.R. 12245 (1995) (chronicling the Com-
mission's indecency enforcement proceedings against Infinity Broadcasting concerning material
aired during the Howard Stern Show). Infinity paid over $1.7 million dollars to settle several
indecency complaints, the largest amount paid to the government by a broadcaster. Id.; Jenny
Hontz, Howard Stern Gets Dumped from Chicago's WCKG-FM, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 9,
1995, at 3.
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(BET),Os which recently was celebrated for airing O.J. Simpson's first
post-criminal trial interview.'0 9 BET came into existence because
cable television operators decided to vertically integrate and help cre-
ate the funding for the cable network."10 Had the assumption per-
sisted that vertical integration"1 was bad for diversity, the mechanism
that actually created BET would not have been allowed. 11 2
108. BET offers a unique selection of urban contemporary programming that includes music
videos, sports, family sitcoms, concerts, specials, talk shows, gospel, news and information. NA-
TIONAL CABLE TELEVISION Ass'N, CABLE TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS 31 (Spring 1996). BET
also schedules infomercials overnight. Elizabeth Sanger, Betting on BET/Black Entertainment
Television Is Rapidly Increasing Its Visibility and Expanding Its Reach, NEWSDAY, Feb. 25, 1996,
(Money & Careers), at 5. BET has 44.2 million subscribers in the United States, Europe and
Africa and reaches 98% of the nation's black cable households. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION
ASS'N, supra, at 31; Sanger, supra, at 1, 5.
109. Martin Peers, BET Stock Sees New Life; Price Zooms in Weeks After O.J. Appearance,
DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 14, 1996, at 8; Sanger, supra note 108, at 5.
110. In 1979, when BET's founder, chairman, and chief executive, Robert L. Johnson decided
to start a black-oriented cable television network, he sought funding from John Malone, Chief
Executive Officer of TCI. Sanger, supra note 108, at 1. TCI financed the venture with a combi-
nation of debt and equity. Id. at 5.
In addition to BET, vertical integration has produced Nickelodeon, C-Span and C-Span It,
Bravo, Turner Network Television, the Discovery Channel, and Cable News Network. Bruce
Fein, Tinkering with Cable When It Isn't Broken, WASH. TIMES, July 25, 1989, at F3; Marks, supra
note 3, at 13.
111. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) ("Economic arrange-
ments between companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship are characterized as
'vertical."').
112. In Brown, the Court stated that "[t]he primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrange-
ment tying a customer to a supplier is that, by foreclosing the competitors of either party from a
segment of the market otherwise open to them, the arrangement may act as a 'clog on competi-
tion,' which 'deprive[s] ... rivals of a fair opportunity to compete.'" (citations omitted). Id. at
323-24. The Court cited trends toward increased concentration and vertical integration and de-
duced that "[t]he necessary corollary of these trends is the foreclosure of independent manufac-
turers from markets otherwise open to them." Id. at 332. Finding that the trends toward vertical
integration were not accidental but rather "the result of deliberate policies of Brown and other
leading shoe manufacturers," the Court remarked that "not only must we consider the probable
effects of the merger upon the economics of the particular markets affected but also ... its
probable effects upon the economic way of life sought to be preserved by Congress." Id. at 332-
33. Based on the trend toward vertical integration in the shoe industry and the fact that the
acquisition involved the largest independent shoe retail chain, the Court concluded that the
merger "may foreclose competition from a substantial share of the markets for men's, women's,
and children's shoes, without producing any countervailing competitive, economic, or social ad-
vantages." Id. at 334; cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[E]xclusive-dealing arrangements of narrow scope ... may be sub-
stantially procompetitive by ensuring stable markets and encouraging long-term, mutually ad-
vantageous business relationships."); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
54-56 & nn. 23-25 (1977) (discussing numerous reasons why vertical restrictions promote product
promotion and distribution efficiencies).
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Consider Lifetime Television, 113 a program service devoted to the
needs and interests of women. 114 Lifetime Television is half-owned by
Hearst and half-owned by Capital Cities/ABC.1" 5 Had antitrust laws
discouraged this form of horizontal concentration' 6-that is, a broad-
cast network owning a cable network-the structure of Lifetime might
be different. Another example of horizontal integration is Spanish
language cable service Galavision, which is owned by Grupo Televisa
S.A., Mexico's largest broadcasting company. 117 Traditional antitrust
analysis would not have precluded the development of services like
BET and Lifetime. But, under a more amorphous antitrust-plus anal-
ysis, well, who knows?
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MEDIA CONCENTRATION; MARKET
FAILURES
Let us now examine the chief arguments against mass media con-
centration. Professor Ben Bagdikian has written often on this side of
the case. 1 8 He argues that ownership influences which ideas or
events are pursued over time by society.119 The power of the media to
treat some subjects briefly and obscurely but others repetitively and in
113. Lifetime Television is a cable network that presents contemporary, innovative program-
ming. Lifetime Television offers original movies, specials, daytime and primetime series includ-
ing "Intimate Portraits," parenting and lifestyle information programs and public awareness
campaigns. NAIONAL CABLE TELEVISION Ass'N, supra note 108, at 59. Lifetime Television has
64 million subscribers in the United States, Mexico, the Caribbean, Central and South America,
Europe, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific Rim. Id.
114. Sara Rimer, T.V. Just For Women... And Men, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1991, at D9.
115. Hearst Corporation and Capital Cities/ABC Inc. acquired Viacom Inc.'s one-third inter-
est in Lifetime Television for approximately $317.6 million in cash. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Viacom
Agrees to Sell Lifetime TV Stake, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 30, 1994, at D4. After the sale, Hearst and
Capital Cities will each own a 50% interest in Lifetime Television. Id.
116. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 334 ( "An economic arrangement between compa-
nies performing similar functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services is
characterized as 'horizontal."'); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 734
n.5 (D. Md. 1976) ("A horizontal merger is one between two actual competitors in the same
market.").
117. Galavision was created by Grupo Television to bring direct-to-home television (DTH) to
Latin America in a partnership with Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation and TCI, Inc. Kath-
leen M. Berry, On The Beam, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 29, 1996, at A5.
118. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (4th ed. 1992) (describing the
growth and impact of concentrated corporate control of the mass media).
119. Id. at 216-18. Bagdikian argues that mainstream news in America favors corporate val-
ues that are eventually accepted as objective since "[t]he tilt [of ownership influences] has been
so quietly and steadily integrated into the normal process of weighing news." Id. at 218; see also
Rance Crain, Objectivity a Media Merger Casualty, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 8, 1996, at 17 (ex-
pressing concern that "[tihe growing and complex entanglements and alliances of media compa-
nies make it next to impossible to discern whether stories and articles are designed to inform or
curry favor with a future partner or affiliate.").
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depth, or to take initiatives unrelated to external events, is a signifi-
cant force exerted by the Fourth Estate. 120
This assertion is right. But, turning these matters over to a manage-
rial class of editors who make these decisions for larger media enter-
prises reveals little about the quality of those decisions. It is not clear
why those decisions would be better if exercised by smaller capitalized
companies. Some of the largest companies may have the most compe-
tent, sensitive managers and editors. Some of the smallest may be
poor at those decisions. Is the editor of Tikkun or America Spectator
going to be better at these decisions than the executive producer of
ABC's World News Tonight because of the ownership of the media
enterprise? That must be the case if antitrust law is to be used to
prevent one type of editorial voice over another.
Consider another concern articulated by Bagdikian: "When an edi-
tor makes a news decision based on corporate orders, or knowledge of
ownership wishes, the editor seldom states the real reason.' 121
Bagdikian notes that "33 percent of American newspaper editors said
they would not feel free to print an item damaging to their parent
firm."'1 22 Again, the issue is whether large size is a reliable predictor
of the offending behavior. Or is it a problem that affects any media
outlet, including the theater usher who is told to avoid giving an aisle-
side "Go Get Your Money Back" review of the clunker on the screen?
Let us look at one further objection raised against media concentra-
tion. Narrow control-whether by government or corporations-is
inherently bad. Bagdikian argues that "no small group, certainly no
group with as much uniformity of outlook and as concentrated in
power as the current media corporations, can be sufficiently open and
flexible to reflect the full richness and variety of society's values and
needs."12 3
True. And false. The wealth and glamour of large corporate media
influences to which ideas and political leaders they will gravitate. The
focus of the Pacifica Radio stations or newspapers published by the
homeless may lie beyond the peripheral vision of people earning com-
petitive salaries and the company executives who hire them. So it is
true to the extent that companies like to avoid undue controversy or
simply miss issues because they can't even see them. But, can one say
120. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 118, at 216-18.
121. Id. at 217.
122. Id.; see also Marc Gunther, All in the Family, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 1995, at 36
(examining the impact of media mergers on the independence of news organizations and citing
examples of hidden agendas, undue pressure and censorship by the corporate parent).
123. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 118, at 223.
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this is generally true of larger media, of, say, Time Warner, which
owned Interscope and is partnered with Madonna, whose records are,
in some minds, pushing the end of the envelope? Or of Viacom, with
MTV? Or TCI, which owns a share of the NewsHour with Jim
Lehrer? 124 Or News Corporation, with its multiple publishing houses?
Moreover, with the rapid embrace of the Internet by these compa-
nies-and its interactive content creation-are large companies lead-
ing to a narrowing or widening of society's values and needs?
To some extent the commercial market will always emphasize the
popular and marginalize other speech, no matter who owns what.
However, marginal speech can become mainstream, too. For exam-
ple, Matt Groening wrote, and still writes, comics for the alternative
press. He also created The Simpsons. Allen Ginsburg was con-
demned as a writer. He now is included in most standard poetry
anthologies. Dissatisfaction with the state of diversity in a more con-
centrated media environment may simply describe the process, if you
will, of valuable marginal speech making its slow but sure path toward
the commercial end of things. Bruce Springsteen, Sinclair Lewis, Lit-
tle Richard, Mad Magazine, Impressionism, Wigstock, J.D. Salinger,
Coolio, Lenny Bruce-marginal yesterday, mainstreamed today.
To be sure, market failures exist in a concentrated media environ-
ment. All that is worth hearing may not succeed commercially. But,
government can address this. The solution to these failures is not nec-
essarily intervention in the marketplace or artificial limits on owner-
ship beyond what antitrust would urge. It is instructive to examine
three such market failures: content, exclusion from broadcast owner-
ship, and dissemination of nonmainstream ideas.
Take content. About thirty percent of households do not get mul-
tichannel video 125 and therefore do not have the rich diet that cable
networks like The Learning Channe' 26 or Discovery 27 offer. There is
a continuing need to carry educational programming across the public
124. But see Marvin Kitman, Octopus Inc. NewsHour, NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 1995, at 21. In
December, 1994, TCI purchased a two-thirds interest in MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, which pro-
duces NewsHour. Id. Kitman suggests that TCI's ownership of NewsHour presents the possibil-
ity of conflicts of interest and hidden agendas in a leading news program. Id.
125. According to A.C. Nielsen Company, of the 95.8 million television households, 65.9%
subscribe to basic cable service. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, supra note 108, at 1.
There are probably another four to five million subscribers to satellite-delivered multichannel
television and about 800,000 multiple multipoint distribution system (MMDS) subscribers. See
DANIEL BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 15.08
(1996) (satellite-delivered); see id § 1.6.01 (MMDS).
126. The Learning Channel offers viewers a way to learn with programs that explore the hu-
manities, arts and sciences, entertainment and much more. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION
ASS'N, supra note 108, at 58. The Learning Channel is a cable network of Discovery Communi-
1996] 1031
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1009
broadcasting system. Adequate funding of that service will provide
real choice and diversity in those areas where the market can not or
will not.128
A second market failure is that individuals today are more or less
excluded from ownership in broadcasting, except for the very wealthi-
est. The value of urban outlets is too great to associate them with
individual voices. But this result may not be so bad. Television sta-
tions that became the private preserve of strong, opinionated owners
pose diversity concerns that are greater than corporate ownership.
Another market failure is that small, nonmainstream voices have
difficulty being distributed in a market where power equates to wide-
spread dissemination. It was, of course, never easy to be a small pub-
lisher, but today it may be harder to compete against the marketing
prowess of best selling magazines, books, records, and video cassettes.
Even here, however, small distribution companies are filling niches
without government involvement. Lower tape duplication and record-
ing equipment costs permit individuals to manufacture and distribute
small pressings of records and copies of video. And specialized
"zines, '' 129 an outgrowth of desktop publishing and Xeroxing in the
late 1980s, created a flourishing culture of small publishers.1 30
The Internet may be the greatest equalizer of communications yet
devised. Everyone has the chance to have a microphone or a news-
stand anywhere in the world. The Web site of a major corporation has
no wider distribution than that of a school kid who developed a Web
page as a homework assignment. The same number of keystrokes
separate the reader from the mightiest and weakest speaker on the
Internet. The new powerhouses of the Internet may be those who con-
trol how we will find things-search engines like Yahoo! 131-not
cations, Inc., which also owns and operates the Discovery Channel. Id. The Learning Channel
has over 45 million subscribers in the United States and Canada. Id.
127. The Discovery Channel offers informative entertainment covering nature and the envi-
ronment, science and technology, history, adventure, and the people who share our world. Id. at
42. The Discovery Channel has more than 67 million subscribers worldwide. Id.
128. But even here, one must note that perhaps the most successful public affairs program
ever, ABC-TV's Nightline, was the creation of the commercial marketplace, not public
television.
129. Underground magazines, or "zines" are "low-budget, personal publications produced as
labors of love by just about anyone with something to say and access to a photocopying
machine." John Flinn, Think It, Publish It. The Zine Scene; Maverick Desktop Editors Run
Anything From Political Rants to Letters From Mom, S. F. EXAM., Jan. 23, 1994, at Al.
130. David M. Gross, Zine Dreams, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 72.
131. Yahoo!, a searchable inventory of more than 30,000 entries, is one of the Internet's most
popular destinations. Ellis Booker, Search Engines Accelerate Internet Browsing, CoM-
PUTERWORLD, Mar. 20, 1995, at 20. Yahoo was created by a pair of Stanford University electri-
cal engineering students who now operate the resource out of the Mountain View, California
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speakers. Deployment of Internet-receive technology such as low-
cost computer models that rely on the Internet instead of hard-drive-
located programs or public school or library availability of modem-
equipped computers will encourage greater diversity more than own-
ership limits.132
There remains one other "market failure" that lies at the root of the
antitrust-plus analysis. It is the fear that excessive concentration of
economic power fosters antidemocratic political pressures: freedom
corrodes, totalitarianism prospers. This fear animated some of those
sponsoring Section Seven of the Clayton Act when it was introduced
in 1949,133 just a few years after the very real economic and speech
monopoly of the Nazi regime and during the reign of Stalin in the
Soviet Union. Even if that threat is distant in the United States today,
advocates see value in invoking antitrust to prevent mergers now in-
stead of having the government break up companies later when con-
centration has led to problems.
In our own country, we certainly have not been free of abuses by
press bullies, big and small. Take your pick: the yellow journalists like
William Randolph Hearst at the turn of the century (contributing to
our entry into the Spanish-American War), 134 the nativist radio
preacher Father Coughlin in the 1930s,135 the abusive Willie Loeb and
his fiefdom of the Manchester Union Leader and the New Hampshire
Sunday News in the 1960s,136 the racist, ranting Nellie Babb on radio
in Dodge City in the 1980s, 137 or, if you will, the radio talk show hosts
of the 1990s with their simplistic antigovernment mantra.
The media is not always responsible. But it is difficult to predict
that large owners vis-i-vis small ones are more inclined towards an-
offices of Netscape Communications Corp. Id.; see also Ron Conte, Jr., Guiding Lights, IN-
TERNET WORLD, May 1996, at 41 (listing various search and index tools for navigating the Net);
Gus Venditto, Search Engine Showdown, INTERNET WORLD, May 1996, at 79 (evaluating seven
additional Internet search engines).
132. See Paul Kapustka, Oracle Demos 'Net Station, COMM. WEEK, Mar. 4, 1996, at 4 (report-
ing that Oracle demonstrated a low-cost, Internet terminal capable of receiving audio and video
feeds from a Web server).
133. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1053-54
(1979).
134. For a biography of William Hearst, see W.A. SWANBERG, CITIZEN HEARST (Collier
Books 1986). On the age of yellow journalism, see EDWIN EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA:
AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA 349-77 (3d ed. 1972).
135. See DONALD WARREN, RADIO PRIEST: CHARLES COUGHLIN, THE FATHER OF HATE RA-
DIO (1996).
136. See KEVIN CASH, WHO THE HELL IS WILLIAM LOEB? (1975), for a portrait of New
Hampshire's notorious newspaper publisher.
137. Megan Rosenfeld, Dodge City Showdown; Racist, Anti-Semitic Radio Broadcast Alleged,
WASH. POST, May 7, 1983, at C1.
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tidemocratic values. Large companies own some of the most broad-
minded media, and some of the least. Some small media owners are
terrific, and some are less so. If anything, large, publicly-held compa-
nies, who face the shareholder version of democracy and an array of
federal and state regulators, may be less inclined to veer far from the
middle. This predisposition towards majoritarian values may support
those who say the mass media is too bland. But that uniformity hardly
supports more intense antitrust scrutiny in the name of avoiding an-
tidemocratic tendencies. Moreover, media today is probably more di-
verse in its outlook than in the 1950s or 1960s, well before the so-
called merger mania.
VI. CONCLUSION
As we examine this emerging marketplace, we should avoid broad
nostrums correlating size and diversity. Smallness is not necessarily
goodness and bigness is not necessarily badness. Behavioral and
structural rules may help promote speech diversity but not necessarily,
and not necessarily by much. Instead, dissection of market definition
and market share will get us closer to the truth in antitrust analysis
than assumptions about size and diversity.
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